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Article 5

Dialogue
Excess Capacity
Some Comments and Questions for Mr. Colton
January 19, 1984
Dear Mr. Colton:
I have read with pleasure and profit your excellent article on excess capacity.' The comments and queries that I send you here were
prepared to clarify my own thinking, not as criticisms, and I should
welcome your reactions. Basically I agree with your thesis that the cost
of excess capacity should be shared by investors and ratepayers. But I
query the basis for that judgment, hence the formula of that sharing.
You reject "culpability" as the basis, and therefore also reject the
"prudent investment" standard. The investors, you say, are paid to assume risks, and "mistakes" in forecasting demand are one of those
risks. 2 If by "mistake" you mean imprudent forecasting, there really is
no difference between your test and the prudent-investment standard.
If, on the other hand, you mean failure of the forecast to materialize,
whether or not the forecasting method was the very best that could be
employed, it is hard for me to see why that risk should be borne by the
management and investors. What signal does the imposition of such
risk send to management? To improve their forecasting? But, by hypothesis, they have already done the best possible job in that respect.
Furthermore, the appropriate regulatory agency presumably approved the forecast when it issued the required authorization to construct the new plant. Are the investors to be the guarantors not only of
the prudence of the management but of the effectiveness of the public
service commission as well? Expansion in the light of projected demand might have come about as a result of regulatory pressure. Consider, for example, the overbuilding of nuclear power plants in the
Washington Public Power fiasco. 3 The trouble with imposing such a
guaranty obligation on the private utility is that it is virtually powerless
1. Colton, Excess Capacity: Who Gets the Charge From the Power Plant?, 34 HASL.J. 1133 (1983).
2. Id. at 1150-53.
3. See Tussing, The Northwest'sElectric GeneratingSurplus: The Bad News Has Yet to
Come, 113 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 16, 1984, at 6.
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to do anything about the composition and financing of the regulatory
commission. In principle, the political process should be thoroughly
shielded from private utility influence. Making the private utility pay
for regulatory failure, therefore, seems irrational.
I do not see how the excess capacity case can be distinguished
from the regulatory "failure" that is exposed when a past rate proves in
actuality to be much more profitable than had been anticipated. Do
you believe that such "excess profits" should be recaptured? Correspondingly, should unanticipatable shortfalls in revenue be made up at
the ratepayers' expense? Most people would reject such a "cost plus"
standard of rate regulation as undermining the incentive of management to cut costs.
I turn now to the question of whether it is even possible to make
the investors pay for risks, such as excess capacity, that they are incapable of managing. Clearly, the rate of return would have to go up to
compensate for the assumption of such risk. Two associated propositions then present themselves. First, it is obviously desirable that the
"deal" between the community and the private utility be explicit as to
the risk that the utility is to bear, ie., the law should be clear on this
point so that risk can be evaluated at the time rates are being set and
before securities are issued or plants are built. Second, the public and
the regulatory commission must confront the question: Which is the
cheapest and fairest way to fund the risk in question? If the utility
bears the risk, will it be entitled to ask for a more than generous premium in view of the uncertainties involved? What will we then do if
experience proves that the forecasted risk was overestimated? By what
standard will such proof be evaluated? On the other hand, if consumer
opposition and regulatory caution allow what proves to be an inadequate premium to cover the risk in question, can we effectively prevent
the management from recouping that undercompensation by stinting
on, for example, service or maintenance?
Considerations like the foregoing lead me to the view that: 1) sharing the cost of overexpansion should be on the basis of management
"imprudence"; 2) that only imprudent excess capacity should be deducted from the rate base; 3) that no construction that has been authorized by the appropriate regulatory agency should be deemed
imprudent; and 4) that the judgment as to imprudence should take into
account that some "excess" serves present ratepayers by providing a
margin of assurance of continuity of service, as reserve or back-up capacity do generally.
Yours,
Louis B. Schwartz*
*
Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.S.,
1932, Wharton School; J.D., 1935, University of Pennsylvania.

Prudence, Planning, and Principled Ratemaking-A
Reply to Professor Schwartz
February 14, 1984
Dear Professor Schwartz:
In response to your letter, I would like to address, in turn, the following points that you raise: 1) the "sharing" concept, 2) excess capacity "signals," 3) the imposition of risk, 4) rate of return, 5) management
of and acceptance of risk, and 6) regulatory approvals and reserve
margins.
The "Sharing" Concept
You open your letter by stating that you agree with my "thesis that
the cost of excess capacity should be shared by investors and ratepayers," but then go on to assert that "sharing the cost of overexpansion
should be on the basis of management 'imprudence.'" I question your
statement of "agreement" with a principled sharing of excess capacity
costs. If a regulatory commission were to find imprudence in a capital
investment, ratepayers should bear none of the imprudently incurred
costs--no sharing should occur. Investors have no legitimate expectation of recovering imprudent expenditures, capital or otherwise, from
customers. I would ask that you articulate for me the conceptual
and/or theoretical basis for requiring ratepayers to "share" the costs of
imprudent expenditures. Would you also indicate to me what formula
of cost-splitting you would utilize?I
It was my thesis that the evaluation of excess capacity should not
differ, in principle, from an evaluation of any other investment proposed to be included in the rate base. 2 In assessing what to include in
the rate base, capital prudently invested in excess capacity should no
more be eligible than other types of capital "prudently invested" but
not "used and useful." It does not matter why the capital is not used
and useful, as the "why" is not part of the analytical process.
1. You suggest that "imprudent excess be deducted from the rate base." Does that
suggestion mean, by implication, that a utility would be allowed depreciation on the imprudent excess as an operating expense? Does your reference to an "imprudent excess" mean
that you accept the notion that there can also be "prudent excess"? If so, how do you define
"excess"? Within the context of such a definition, on what basis do you find that excess to be
"used and useful" and thus includable in the rate base?
2. Colton, Excess Capacity. Who Gets the Charge From the Power Plant?, 34 HAsTINGS L.J. 1133, 1136 (1983).
[723]
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Consider the following hypotheticals:
1. Assume a regulatory jurisdiction that does not permit construction work in progress (CWIP) in the rate base. Utility A begins to construct Whiteacre Generating Station with plans, and a reasonable
expectation, that the plant would begin commercial operation in 1986.
Due to unavoidable delays, and with no imprudent action whatsoever
on the utility's part, the commercial operation of Whiteacre is delayed
until 1988. Utility A may not place its capital investment in Whiteacre
in the 1986 rate base even though it engaged in no imprudent actions
that led to the delay.
2. Utility B owns Blackacre Generating Station, a one hundred
dollar power plant with a ten-year depreciable life. Blackacre meets all
applicable safety standards and is prudently operated in all respects, so
that no question of imprudent action by Utility B exists. In 1984, with
an original cost net depreciation of sixty dollars left, there is a fire that
totally destroys the plant and leaves it with a salvage value of zero dollars. Utility B must thus remove the investment in Blackacre from its
rate base even though no imprudence on the part of Utility B was responsible for the fire.
3. Utility C owns Greenacre Generating Station, a central-station
coal-fired 650-megawatt power plant with a net investment of one hundred dollars. A spectacular breakthrough in energy technology occurs
that allows every electric utility customer to buy a machine that converts air to electricity. Every house has such a machine placed in it and
traditional power plants are as obsolete as the horse and buggy. Utility
C must remove Greenacre from its rate base even though the unexpected technological breakthrough had nothing to do with its prudence.
4. Utility D has two customers with a constant total year-round
demand of 1000 megawatts. It owns Blueacre Generating Station, a
1000- megawatt power plant, to meet that demand. One customer is a
manufacturing company that has a year-round energy demand of 999
megawatts and a cheery future. The other customer, Elder, is a ninetyyear old person with a one-megawatt demand. The owner of the manufacturing plant falls in love, closes the plant, and moves to Europe.
Does Elder pay the rate base costs of all 1000 megawatts of Blueacre
despite the fact that her current demand is only one megawatt?
5. Utility E has one customer with a constant year-round demand
of one megawatt. Utility E has a one-megawatt oil turbine with fuel
costs of six cents per kilowatt-hour. A manufacturing company tells
Utility E that it is moving into the area and needs an energy source to
satisfy a constant year-round demand of 999 megawatts. Utility E
builds a 1000-megawatt plant with a fuel cost of two cents per kilowatthour and then bulldozes the turbine. However, the owner of the manufacturing company falls in love and moves to Europe, leaving the plant
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incomplete and inoperable; the promised industry thus requires no
electric capacity from the previously completed generating station.
Therefore, even though the new power plant's marginal fuel costs are
cheaper than the turbine's were, and despite the lack of imprudence on
the part of Utility E, the capital costs are not eligible to be included in
the rate base as used and useful capital.
Each of these examples demonstrates the failure of one or more
elements of the "prudent management theory" of ratemaking. Example 1 is the situation in which a capital investment has not yet come to
be used and useful at the time and in the manner initially anticipated
by the utility. While it is reasonable to assume that the plant will eventually be necessary to provide adequate and reliable service to customers, its possible future use does not change current ratemaking
treatment. The reasonable and prudent initial expectation of an earlier
operation is irrelevant to current ratemaking. 3 In contrast, Example 2
is the situation in which a capital investment that has been used and
useful no longer is. Its prior use, however, does not dictate current
ratemaking. The reasonable and prudent past reliance on the plant's
4
operation is irrelevant to current ratemaking.
Example 3 is a case of technological obsolescence and exemplifies
most, if not all, excess capacity situations. The power plant is capable
of being operated from an engineering perspective, but there is no demand for the plant's productive capability. It does not differ in concept
or application from the technological and economic obsolescence attributable to better insulation, higher efficiency home appliances, or
high efficiency industrial processes. The lack of foreseeability of such
obsolescence by the utility does not change the resulting exclusion of
the obsolete capital from the rate base. Examples 4 and 5 are variations of the concept of economic obsolescence: previously used capacity
and reasonably constructed future capacity that is rendered unnecessary, respectively. Unlike the plants in Examples 1 and 2, these plants
are capable of operating. Unlike the plant in Example 3, the plants are
totally capable of producing a service which is demanded within the
economy. In each situation, the utility's projection of future determinants of demand was prudent, but wrong.
Several conclusions can be summarized from this brief discussion
of these hypotheticals. First an unanticipated delay in the usefulness of
an investment does not dictate current ratemaking treatment. Second,
the past or projected use of the investment does not dictate current
ratemaking treatment. Third, the "controllability" or "foreseeability"
3. This situation parallels the situation in which an excess capacity adjustment is
made with the "excess" plant determined to be the marginal unit in time.
4. This situation parallels the situation in which an excess capacity adjustment is
made with the "excess" plant determined to be the economically marginal unit.
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of events and factors that affect the need for a particular investment do
not dictate current ratemaking treatment. Fourth, the engineering
"operability" of an investment does not dictate current ratemaking
treatment. Fifth, the prudence of management's actions does not dictate current ratemaking treatment of investment.
Excess Capacity Signals
You query: "What signal does the imposition of such risk send to
management? To improve their forecasting? But by hypothesis, they
have already done the best possible job in that respect." Initially, I
disagree with the implicit assertion in your statement that the imposition of risk is only to serve as a "signal" to the bearer of risk. Your
adherence to a belief that an excess capacity adjustment only constitutes some sort of "signal" misconstrues the purpose of such an adjustment in much the same way as those persons who concern themselves
with the appropriateness of imposing "penalties." The fact remains
that an excess capacity adjustment is simply a cost apportionment
mechanism. It is neither a penalty nor a punishment nor a result of a
regulatory judgment that the utility company breached some duty of
care. Not having made a judgment as to the process by which the excess was created, 5 there is no need for a utility commission to "signal"
the utility of anything. If one accepts the notion that an excess capacity
adjustment is simply a cost apportionment mechanism, one does not
get bogged down in the signal/penalty stigma.
To extend the analysis even further, one may assume arguendo the
validity of your assertion that the imposition of risk is only to serve as a
signal of sorts to the bearer of risk. A look at that proposition from the
reverse perspective reveals the fallacy in such reasoning. What signal
does the imposition of the risk of excess capacity send to electric ratepayers? Ratepayers had no say in the decision to construct a generating plant that is later found to be excess. If the utility company lacked
any "culpability," surely the ratepayers lack it even more.
Moreover, an application of the signal analysis to the examples
discussed above reveals further errors. In Example 2, why should the
utility bear the risk of fire destroying the value of plant? To improve its
fire-prevention actions? But by hypothesis it had already done the best
possible job in that respect. In Example 3, why should the utility bear
the risk of technology rendering the central station industry obsolete?
What action does such an imposition of risk serve to modify? Why
5. A further point of disagreement centers on an empirically ascertainable fact. I disagree that a utility that operates "prudently" is doing "the best possible job." There can, in
my opinion, be inefficiency and non-state-of-the-art management without reaching the level
of "imprudence." Thus, an excess capacity adjustment can act as an incentive to fine tune
planning processes without implying a finding of imprudence.
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should the utility bear the risk that the owner of an industry other than
itself is going to close a manufacturing plant and move to Europe?
What signal does that send?
The Imposition of Risk
You make the statement that "it is hard to see why that risk [of
overprojecting demand] should be borne by management and investors." In addition to the points raised above, there are at least three
reasons why that apportionment is not only reasonable, but necessary.
The Investors andManagement Are Paidto Bear the Risk of Investment
If one adheres, as I do, to the view that the Discounted Cash Flow
(DCF) model accurately measures the cost of capital to a public utility,
one also adheres to the view that the market sets the price of capital
and that part of that process is a consideration of the riskiness of the
venture. Value Line obviously agrees with this notion by its tracking of
the Betas of public utilities. Standard& Poor's obviously agrees with
this notion by its sensitivity in bond ratings to the size of a company's
construction budget. Any analysis of pre-tax interest- coverage ratios is
oriented toward determining the riskiness of a capital venture. The
fourth paragraph of your letter indicates to me that you, too, accept the
notion, either implicitly or explicitly, that the cost of capital is established in part by considerations of risk.
It is well accepted doctrine that one component of a common equity return is the "risk premium." Common equity is not senior debt,
making it different from even preferred equity in this respect. Common equity holders are, as a result, the last to be paid in the event of
financial difficulties. The return on equity is thus higher than it otherwise would be if the shareholder did not bear the risk of revenue
shortfalls. With this in mind, I find it difficult to understand the protestations of those who seek to relieve the equity holder of the burden of a
'6
risk that "turns out bad."
It is clear that, legally, the risk for which investors are compensated is not the risk that management is imprudent. Seminal rate of
return cases, such as Hope7 and Bluefield s make clear that there is an
assumption of prudent and efficient management. To only make an
adjustment in the event of imprudent management is thus to allow
6. I analogize the process and result to an insurance company. The insurance company may collect premiums for 20 years without having to pay a claim. If my house bums
down in year 2 1, however, the company may not then seek a "sharing" of the costs because
the burden of the loss is "too great."
7. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
8. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679
(1923).
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shareholders to collect the compensation but to relieve them of the very
risk they are paid to assume.
Thus, I assert that the following is true: 1) investors are compensated for the "risk" of the enterprise through increased rates of return;
2) management imprudence is not among the risks for which they are
compensated; and 3) the risk, therefore, is that the enterprise may suffer
a loss for reasons that are no fault of its investors or its management
and for reasons possibly beyond either's control. I believe the burden
is on you to explain why demand forecasts that are wrong, but still
prudent, do not fall within that risk.9
The Investors, andManagement as Their Agents andEmployees, Control the
Exposure of the Utility to Risk

One basic premise of this nation's system of free enterprise is: "He
who calls the shots bears the risks." The converse is also accepted:
"He who bears the risks calls the shots." If the ratepayers are to bear
the risks of the utility enterprise, then there must necessarily be a realignment into cooperative or public ownership. In fact, it is the utility's management that has both the authority and the obligation to
manage the risks of the enterprise. It is management who decides
whether to build a nuclear, coal, or peaking plant. It is management
who decides whether to use a trending, econometric, or end- use forecasting model. It is management who decides whether to review construction plans on an annual, biannual, or semi-annual basis.
It must be accepted that management stands in the shoes of the
investors and the actions of the management must be attributed to the
investor. Thus, it is the investor who controls the exposure to risk and
it is the investor who should bear the burden of such a decision. If
management commits to a multi-year, multi-billion dollar central station power plant construction project in times when uncertainty in demand is great, interest rates are high, and the risk of future
overcapacity is foreseeable, it is not the ratepayer who can cause that
decision to be changed. It is not the ratepayers who have the option of
saying "we don't want to risk three billion dollars of our money based
on the current forecast."
Regulation Stands as a Surrogatefor Competition and an Excess Capacity
Adjustment Is Simply a Regulatory Control on the Exaction of
Monopoly-SupportedPrices
One major premise of utility regulation is that the regulatory pro9. There is ample theory, as well, that one element of the risk premium is to compensate investors for facing the risk of unknown risks. The development of advanced technologies is such an example. The failure of a demand forecast to materialize and the imposition
of a resulting excess capacity adjustment could be construed as another such example.
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cess is to stand as a surrogate for competition. While not intended to
be a substitute for competitive pressures, a "regulated monopoly" and a
"competitive marketplace" should reach fundamentally similar economic allocations of resources. In this respect, it is important to recognize excess capacity for the problem that it really presents. Rather than
being the "supply problem" it is usually labeled, excess capacity is actually a "price problem." It is not that the capacity cannot be used, but
rather that customers are unwilling to use it at the price they are being
asked to pay. Assuming any normal price elasticity, a lowering of
prices would induce greater consumption and the excess capacity
would cease to exist.' 0
The electric utility industry seeks to insulate itself from those effects that would occur if it existed in a competitive market by pursuing
rate increases enforceable as higher tariffs approved by public service
commissions. Through such a mechanism, the utility seeks to impose
costs on consumers that would not be possible in a competitive marketplace and would not be allowed by an unregulated monopoly. There is
no principled rationale for perverting the regulatory process to authorize and enforce this otherwise unlawful or undesirable result. A disallowance of excess capacity from the rate base only serves to keep the
system of regulation doing that which it was intended to do.
One key basis for the regulated monopoly status of public utilities
is the policy judgment that the industry is entitled to such status because it is a natural monopoly. One attribute of a natural monopoly is
that the firm that exists to serve the marketplace is the least-cost producer over the entire range of demand. In light of this policy judgment, regulation was imposed upon the utility industry, presumably to
the benefit of both the industry and consumers. Utility companies were
protected from destructive competition by the recognition of exclusive
service territories. Customers were protected from monopoly- supported price discrimination or profit-taking by the interposition of regulatory agencies. The underlying rationale, however, remained that
the utility involved remain the least-cost producer.
In situations of excess capacity, the electric utility has ceased to be
the least-cost firm. In an ideal situation, a new firm could offer the
existing level of service with an identical plant, less the redundant component, at a lower cost. In the less than ideal real world situation, however, it is clear that adherence to the theory of natural monopoly/leastcost production in the electric utility industry requires the regulatory
process to make revenue adjustments eliminating the impact of excess
generating capacity.
10. This analysis is not to suggest that the lowered prices will be totally compensatory.
However, in periods of oversupply, a well-accepted market clearing device is to lower prices,
even to below cost.
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To summarize, you ask why investors and management should
bear the risk of demand forecasts being wrong even if prudent. There
are conceptual, theoretical, and practical reasons for that allocation.
Conceptually, it is the investors and management who control the exposure to risk. It seems wrong to impose the price of that expansion on
those who have no control over it, the ratepayers. Theoretically, the
status of the electric industry as a regulated monopoly is founded on
the notion that the industry is a natural monopoly and that individual
firms are least-cost producers. It lacks sense to approve by regulation
rates that exceed those rates that would be charged by a least-cost firm.
Practically, it is the investor who has been compensated for bearing the
risks of the entrepreneurial endeavor. That compensation does not
cover the risk of imprudence. Failing to make an excess capacity adjustment allows the investors to escape the very risk for which they
have been previously paid.
Rate of Return
You argue, in reference to the risk of absorbing an excess capacity
adjustment, that "[c]learly the rate of return would have to go up to
compensate for the assumption of such a risk." There are at least six
reasons why that result is not so "clear" as you wolid suggest.
First, the acceptance of this argument would reduce any regulatory commission to quietism. Any initiative that might arguably upset
stockholders-for example, requiring a utility to finance conservation
improvements or disallowing "excessive" costs in an affiliated transaction-would lead to increased capital costs and therefore be counterproductive. Any response to mis-, mal-, or nonfeasance would be met
with the same logic."
Second, this argument assumes that there will be recurring excess
capacity situations facing the utility company. If, in the alternative, the
market perceives the regulatory commission's disallowance as a one
time event that will not be repeated, there will, in theory, be no increase
in the risk premium.
Third, this argument assumes no new investors. In the event that
dividends do fall, existing stockholders will take a one-time capital loss.
11. This argument further supposes that the invariable investor response to an excess
capacity problem will include a perception of the regulator as the root of the problem. An
alternative scenario would suggest that the market would credit regulatory action in genuine
cases of inefficient management, not raising to the level of imprudence, rather than debiting
such action by raising the cost of capital. It is quite easy to imagine the market reducing the
risk premium for utilities tightly supervised by a regulatory commission committed to the
prevention of large-scale financial problems like the ones involving excess capacity.
For a discussion of such financial problems, see Colton, Community Energy Management: The Financial Implications to the Electric Utility Industry (prepared under contract to
the Nebraska Energy Office, Lincoln, Nebraska, Feb., 1984) (on file with the author).
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New investors, however, will receive the present market rate of return
on their investment1 2 and so will be as well off in terms of return on
investment as the original stockholders had been before the dividend
cut. Thus, with the danger to investment having passed, future investors will have no incentive to seek higher risk premiums.
Fourth, the argument assumes a continued reliance on new investment notwithstanding the presence of substantial excess capacity already on the system. In order for there to be sufficient excess such that
a regulatory commission would be moved to make a revenue adjustment, there must be sufficient capacity available to prevent the utility
from needing to go to the market for major new financing in the near
future. If the amount of the excess is so small that justifiable new investment in plant will be necessary over the course of the upcoming
several years, then it is highly unlikely that a commission would have
disallowed the excess capacity costs in the first place.
Fifth, the argument assumes that the disallowance of excess capacity from jurisdictional revenue requirements implies a total denial of
return on investment in the capacity to investors. That is clearly not
the situation. The excess is still available to the utility company for
sales off-system. To the extent that the utility can vend its production
capability in a non-jurisdictional setting, investors face no greater risk
than usual of being uncompensated.
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, this argument ignores
the counter-balancing impact of market-demanded rates of return engendered by the presence of the excess capacity. Frequently, analysts
concentrate on the rate of return impact of making an excess capacity
adjustment and ignore the impact of not making such an adjustment.
Reliance solely upon a DCF return analysis tends to institutionalize
this oversight. The DCF model measures the perceptions of investors
and the results of marketplace actions based upon those perceptions. It
does not, however, capture the causes of the increased costs that are
measured.
In calculating a DCF rate of return, certain assumptions are made
about a company's market-to-book ratio. That ratio is then used as a
major determinant of the cost of capital.' 3 When a utility company's
actual rate of return is consistently below the allowed rate of return, it
is reasonable to expect the company's market-to-book ratio to be less
12. The utility stock price will fall to whatever level is necessary to equate the dividend
amount divided by the stock price to whatever the prevailing rate of return is.
13. When market-to-book ratios are below one, that is considered to be evidence of the
fact that investors are not expecting to earn a return that would allow them to pay a price
equal to book value. In other words, the marketplace sets its own cost of capital for the
utility and if that cost cannot be earned by maintaining a market-to-book ratio of one or
greater, the investors adjust their market price downward until the cost of capital can be
earned.
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than one. This observation is important because when an electric utility's rate base contains substantial amounts of non-productive capital,
such as excess capacity, there is a tendency for that firm to have a difficult time earning its allowed rate of return on book value.
The calculation and analysis of earnings is also an important part
of a DCF rate of return analysis. Earnings calculations are used both
in determining market-to-book ratios and in examining projected
growth rates. It is fundamental that a utility company generates "earnings" through the use of capital invstment, 1 e., a power plant generates
kilowatt hours which, when translated into sales, result in earnings.
Earnings, or net income, flow from revenue that is based on a utility's
tariffs. That revenue is generated by sales that are associated with the
use of specific capacity. These simple observations are important because when a utility has excess capacity there is, by definition, a mismatch between capacity and effective demand. Even if included in rate
base, excess capacity is not actually generating dollars. As a result, net
income that is available to distribute as earnings must be spread over
more units of capital than it would be if no excess existed in the utility's
system. By spreading those available earnings over more units of capital, a lower returnper unit of capital value results. Thus, by its very
nature, excess capacity results in a dilution of earningsfer unit of capital ceterisparibus.
Both of these factors-a market-to-book ratio less than one and
diluted earnings per unit-tend to drive up market-demanded rates of
return for an electric utility that maintains excess capacity. Returns are
increased in an attempt to bring market prices up to book value. Ratios
below one are generally construed as evidencing a need for increased
allowed rates of return. In reality, the market actions are simply a recognition by investors that they must purchase more than one unit of
capital to gain any given unit which will generate earnings. To have a
regulatory commission make an excess capacity revenue adjustment,
thus forcing management to deal with the problem, 14 will protect the
shareholders' interest in investing only in productive capital that will
not automatically dilute earnings. Demanded rates of return will tend
to decrease as a result. Based on these six reasons, I submit to you that
the statement that "clearly the rate of return would have to go up" is
somewhat simplistic and likely erroneous.
Management and Acceptance of Risk
You begin the analysis in your fifth paragraph by questioning
"whether it is even possible to make the investors pay for excess capacity risks they are incapable of managing." It appears that you have
14.

It could, for example, sell the excess or take a one-time capital loss.

March 1984]

DIALOGUE

made the common mistake of confusing the terms "risk" and "uncertainty." The words are not coterminous. I disagree with the assertion
that investors, through management, are "incapable of managing risk."
The single word that best describes the planning environment of public
utilities in recent years is "uncertainty." Fuel prices have soared; basic
institutional arrangements facing the utilities, especially at the federal
level, have been subject to sudden and profound changes; capital costs
have risen out of all bounds; inflation has been very high for much of
the period; and a major depression has occurred. Even so, it is not
entirely beyond the control of utility planners to manage the "risk" that
accompanies such uncertainty.
In such a situation, the prudent utility planner will seek to provide
the system for which he is working with the greatest possible flexibility.
Unquestionably, the basis for seeking to obtain greater capital flexibility in times of great uncertainty is the enhanced risk that planned-for
conditions may not in fact materialize. Both the probability that anticipated conditions will actually occur and the probability that construction based on a long-lead-time construction plan will be misplaced or
redundant are increased. The result of a failure to recognize this basic
planning principle is seen in the15 substantial amount of excess capacity
litigation in the country today.
The problem of uncertainty can be minimized, however, if public
utilities engage in alternative development scenarios. Short-term planning solutions may well be the optimum response by a utility faced
with a very uncertain future. They keep options open and they allow
the chance to gain more information as the future unfolds. These
"short-term" solutions may include investments in energy management
strategies, 16 extending the life of existing power plants,1 7 and constructing smaller power plants.' 8
15. See, e.g., Colton, supra note 2, at 1133-34 nn.l-2.
16. See, e.g., Build Flexibility-NotPowerPlants, 112 PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 26, 1983,
at 17.
17. See, e.g., Extending the Lifespan of Fossil Plants, ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH
INST. J., June, 1983, at 7.

18. Higher relative prices signal the producer to reduce reliance on the factor of production whose price is rising-increased interest rates, for example, indicate a rise in the cost
of capital-in favor of greater use of other factors whose prices are not rising so rapidly. The
construction of smaller plants typically takes less time and, hence, ties up capital for a
shorter period of time and should therefore be preferred ceterisparibus in times of high
interest rates. In a similar vein, falling demand growth means that very large plants embodying large economies of scale cannot be built ahead of time secure in the knowledge that
demand will fill out the new capacity quickly, resulting in longer intervals to full utilization
and higher carrying costs. Shorter-lead-time plants would mean that the risk of under-utilization, or non- utilization, of capacity would be minimized. Finally, in terms of heightened
uncertainty per se, smaller units, non-generation alternatives, and institutional rearrangements, such as central dispatch of more than one utility's generating units, all serve to minimize risk and promote increased flexibility relative to large scale power plants.
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In summary, while it is true that a utility company, through its
investors and management, are "incapable of managing" uncertainty, it
is not true that they are incapable of managing the accompanying risks.
There are specific actions that can be undertaken that recognize the
uncertainty and reduce the exposure to the possible adverse impacts of
that uncertainty.
You continue your analysis in paragraph five by stating that "it is
obviously desirable that the 'deal' between the community and the private utility be explicit as to the risk that the utility is to bear." I agree
with that statement. Such an agreement, I believe, will lead to more
rational capacity expansion planning.' 9 I believe that you are wrong,
however, when you ask the following rhetorical question that implies
that a utility will be "entitled to ask for a more than generous premium
in view of the uncertainties involved."
By law, as set forth in Hope, Blueield, and the other rate of return
cases, the utility is entitled to that rate of return necessary to attract
capital. No question of "generosity" exists at all. If a return of 13.2 per
cent will allow capital to flow to the firm, then that, and only that, is
what is allowed under the law. A higher rate such as 14.5 per cent, so
as to be "more than generous" in light of the risks, may not be granted.
The market-demanded rate of return already includes an assessment of
the risks.
I believe that you are also wrong when you suggest that the premium should be adjusted depending upon the ultimate resolution of
the uncertainties by asking: "What will we then do if experience proves
that the forecasted risk was overestimated?" The premium allowed
within a return on equity is not a prepayment of the possible future
losses. Rather, it is compensation for the assumption that a future revenue stream will not materialize. Regardless of the resolution of the
uncertainty, a more risky revenue stream has a lesser present value
than a less risky revenue stream. That is true even if, ultimately, the
revenue streams turn out to be identical. Again, the premium to be
19. As discussed supra, utility companies are intended to be least-cost producers of
energy. In seeking to justify capacity expansion plans, however, particularly ones involving
large-scale generating plants, frequently not all costs are included in the calculus. The industry and many regulators automatically accept, without rigorous analysis, assertions that
large central station plants are less expensive that smaller alternatives because of asserted
operating efficiencies and economies of scale. Not included in the analysis is the risk that
the resolution of uncertainty will be contrary to the projected need for the larger plant and
that the capacity so constructed will accordingly be "excess." The determination that the
utility will bear the risk of "being wrong," even if prudent, will help internalize the costs of
that risk. To the extent that the imposition of the risk of future excess capacity results in
higher cost of capital, the life-cycle cost of the plant will be affected and consequently will be
factored into the initial determination of cost-effectiveness for the project. Your statement is
thus "obviously desirable" not only from a "fairness" point of view, but from a planning
perspective as well.
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allowed to investors is that which is necessary to allow the utility to
attract capital, no more and no less. If a utility's rate of return is adequate to attract capital, it is "adequate to cover the risk." The ultimate
resolution of uncertainty cannot result in under- or overcompensation
and, in the respective situations, neither the ratepayers nor the investors
have a claim of redress against the other party.
Regulatory Approvals and Reserve Margins
You urge in your concluding paragraph that regulatory approval
of forecasted demands at the time power plant construction is initially
authorized should serve to insulate electric utilities from subsequent
excess capacity adjustments. I believe that this assertion overstates the
role of a regulatory commission and understates the degree of care to
be exercised in utility planning. It is first necessary to examine the entire planning process that serves as the foundation for the construction
and placement into commercial operation of a major power plant.
Initial regulatory approval of the decision to begin construction of
a power plant relates to only one small part of the utility planning process. Even if one assumes a prudent and correct decision to initiate
construction of a power plant, a course of action that was correct at the
time it began can become incorrect. The initial decision to undertake a
major capital investment involving a multi-year commitment occurs at
a particular point in time. There may be several subsequent decisions
to continue, to discontinue, or to modify the project. Such a process of
periodic reevaluation as new information involving major variables becomes available is sensible and necessary. A planner who fails to undertake such a periodic review and thereby fails to acknowledge and
act upon new information that is available and that may substantially
affect either the need for or the cost-effectiveness of a project, fails to
exercise the care that should ordinarily be expected from utility
planners.
Prudence and good judgment are required in every management
decision, from the first stages of demand forecasting and capacity planning up through decisions to continue, defer, or cancel further construction at any time up to actual project completion. This ongoing
management diligence is particularly critical during times of pervasive
uncertainty. Approval by a regulatory commission does not, and
should not, insulate a company from any further responsibility in decisionmaking with regard to capacity expansion. 20 Viewed in this light,
20. As a supplemental point, the existence of regulatory approval, and even the possible existence of regulatory pressure, is not a determinative factor in making an excess capacity adjustment either. Notwithstanding the action of the regulatory agency, the decision to
build or not to build remains withing the prerogative of the company management. As the
courts have consistently held, utility actions which fall short of being mandated or ordered
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investors are not, as you assert, "guarantors" of anything; they simply
bear the risk of the enterprise. While regulatory approval of any particular forecasted demand might well make that risk less, such approval
hardly serves to absolve the investor of that traditional role.

You go on to urge in your concluding paragraph that "some 'excess' serves present ratepayers by providing a margin of assurance of
continuity of service, like reserve or back-up capacity do generally." I
disagree with you on what may be termed "technical grounds." If ex-

cess capacity exists, by definition the capacity is beyond that which is
necessary to provide adequate and reliable service. The capacity necessary to provide adequate and reliable service includes reasonable reserve margins. Thus, if capacity is necessary2 ' to "assure the continuity
or back-up capacity generally," it
of service" by providing "reserve
'22
cannot be deemed "excess."
Conclusion

There are ample practical, conceptual, and theoretical grounds
upon which to base a rejection of the "prudent management" theory of

ratemaking for excess electric generating capacity. I would submit that
the above discussion demonstrates that "prudence" in investment has
no relevance as to whether an excess capacity adjustment should be
made for electric utilities. Adherence to a "prudent management" theory is ill- conceived and unfounded in principled utility ratemaking or

utility regulation. Proper utility ratemaking calls for the application of
the "used and useful" concept to exclude the costs of excess capacity
by the regulatory commission remain the actions of the management, not the regulator. It is
thus management, and not the regulator which is to be held accountable for them. See, e.g.,
Iowa Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 335 N.W.2d 178,
182-83 (Iowa 1983) (Iowa Supreme Court considered "whether the state by adopting rules
permitting [utility shutoffs] has made the action that of the state" and concluded that it did
not). Cf.Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974).
21. A number of models have been developed to determine what level of capacity is
"necessary." Among those models is, for example, the Electric Power Research Institute's
"Over/Under Model." For a number of reasons that are outside the scope of this reply, I
reject the Over/Under Model as being adequate, or even particularly relevant, in determining whether any given capacity is to be determined "excess." I believe the best model developed to date is that set forth in Singer & Hansen, Iowa Power System Simulation Study
(IPSSS) (prepared for the Electric Operations Section, Operations Review Division, Iowa
State Commerce Commission, July 12, 1983) (on file with the HastingsLaw Journal).
22. Thus, while the hypotheticals set forth supra do not include an analysis of necessary
reserve margins, that omission was simply for the sake of simplicity and not as an implied
assertion that any reserve would constitute "excess capacity."
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from revenue requirements. A less extreme remedy is a "sharing" ap23
proach such as the one outlined in my article.
Sincerely,
Roger D. Colton*

23. Colton, supra note 2, at 1146-49, 1153-63.
* General Counsel for the Community Action Research Group, Inc. (CARG), of
Ames, Iowa; member, Iowa State Bar. CARG is a research and consulting firm that specializes in public utility regulation. B.A., 1975, Iowa State University; J.D., 1981, University of
Florida.

A Rebuttal to Mr. Colton's Reply
March 7, 1984
Dear Mr. Colton:
I thank you for your detailed response to my letter of January 19. I
have reviewed it and would like to offer some comments. You erroneously attribute to me the view that the cost of imprudent excess capacity investment should be shared by investors and ratepayers. My view
is only that some "excess" is not imprudent, especially if approved by
the regulatory agency. For example, "excess" investment, in the sense
of capacity not actually used, may be both warranted and prudent if it
serves as a back-up to assure continuity of supply. Once "excess" is
properly classified as either prudent or imprudent, I of course agree
that the cost of imprudent excess capacity should be borne by investors
alone.
I must disagree with the analysis in your Example 2, where the
utility's plant is destroyed by fire. This is not in any event an "excess
capacity" case. Either the utility was imprudent in failing to carry adequate insurance or it had already recovered the insurance premiums.
No case for further burdening the ratepayers is made out. As to the
retention in the rate base of capacity that unforeseeab l becomes technologically obsolete, as in your Example 3, there may be a very good
reason for ratepayers to prefer such retention over other alternatives.
For example, a utility's management, confronted with no-fault responsibility for the loss of a prudent capacity investment, might well decide
to continue with the old, expensive technology. Certainly, future financing will have to offer investors a premium to insure against unanticipatable obsolescence. That premium would have to be generous in
view of the incommensurability of the risk. The ratepayers lose.
I am puzzled by your rejection of my "signal" analysis. I had
thought that the central purpose of ratemaking law was precisely to set
up a system of incentives, i e. signals, that encourage the most efficient
operation. Your view that "excess capacity adjustment is simply a costapportionment mechanism" strikes me as manifesting both an astounding faith in accounting and an invitation to regulate without regard to
policy purposes, probable adaptations by the regulated utilities, or ultimate impact on service.
You conceptualize my position as "reliev[ing] the equity holder of
the burden of risk which 'turns out bad."' Not so. I would simply not
burden the equity holders with risks that they did not undertake and
for which the rate of return does not compensate. The "deal" between
[7381
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the public and the utility company could be structured in one of two
ways: 1) the utility insures against all risks, foreseeable or not; or 2) the
utility takes only the foreseeable risks against which it can prudently
guard or procure insurance. It seems to me that the public will pay
more under the first structure. I wouldn't want the public to pay the
kind of insurance premium that the first structure implies. Do you
want the premium to be high enough to insure against the risk of
bombing in a war?
Your argument that excess capacity does not exist as an independent problem, but is really a "price problem," puzzles and astounds me.
There would be no excess capacity, you argue, if the rates were reduced' to attract enough new users. An evaluation of the possibility or
propriety of such rate reductions would surely have to address some
serious questions. What is the impact of the elasticity of demand, i e.,
how far must the rates drop in order to lure the required new buyers?
How and when will the rates have to be readjusted upward later as
normal expansion calls for additional capacity for which investors will
demand compensation? What will be the social costs of this rate instability? What impact on competing energy suppliers will the shift of
customers to the artificially and temporarily lower rates of the "excess
capacity supplier" have? I do not see the answers to these questions,
indeed I do not see the questions, factored into your proposal to penalize prudent management for unforseeable fluctuations in the demand
for fairly priced electric power. Furthermore, I wonder how you would
incorporate the excess capacity that exists during off-peak periods into
your analytic scheme. Would you want the rate base reduced in proportion to this "unused" capacity even if the utility's management had
exercised the utmost zeal and talent in devising rate incentives to divert
traffic from peak to off-peak periods?
Your argument that the "excess capacity firm" ceases to be the
low- cost supplier because an alternative hypothetical supplier that is
not burdened with excess capacity and its related debt could meet the
demand at lower rates is out of touch with both reality and the underlying assumptions of regulation. There is no such alternative supplier. If
there were one, its management would have made the same "prudent"
overestimation of demand as the existing supplier's management.
Your rejection of a regulated monopoly if the possibility exists that a
competitor could supply all orpart of the demand at a lower cost ignores the universally recognized fact that a public utility rate structure
may be designed to permit internal subsidization of some classes of
users, such as "lifeline rates," and to prohibit "cream skimming" by
what you call "least-cost producers."
1. Even if rates were reduced below a compensatory level, as you imply in your footnote 9.
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I am unpersuaded by your argument that expanded risks need not

be compensated by higher returns. Certainly the contrary view does
not mean that the investors should be immunized from all utility risks.
Utility investors know that costs resulting from imprudent management decisions will be disallowed by the regulatory commission. They
know that the regulatory commission may reduce a previously allowed
rate of return or change a depreciation allowance. Such things are reflected in normal rate of return expectations. You cannot be serious in
suggesting that "regulatory quietism" is implied by my argument that it
is unattractivefrom the ratepayers'pointof view to include prudent miscalculations in the "insurance policy" that they buy from the investors.
One of the most revealing insights into the excess capacity problem comes from the realization thatpublicy-owned utilities also make
gigantic mistakes in their predictions, resulting in costs that must be
borne by the ratepayers, t e., taxpayers. 2 If the excess capacity of such
public utilities must be paid for by the public when there is no private
management or private investment, it is a little strange that the excess
capacity of private utilities should be paid for by private investors
when private management is not shown to be at fault. The increasing
tendency among regulatory commissions to allow construction work in
progress in the rate base and to impose the cancellation costs incurred
in abandoning nuclear power commitments that were prudent when
made 3 on the ratepayers are further indications of the untenability of
your proposition that regulatory commissions should rigorously limit
the rate base to presently used and useful facilities regardless of how
the excess capacity came about.
I am giving a copy of this letter, my previous letter, and your good
memorandum to the editors of the HastingsLaw Journal. I have not
addressed every one of your contentions because I suspect the editors
may not have space for our full arguments.
Yours,
Louis B. Schwartz

2. See Tussing, The Northwest'sElectric GeneratingSurplus: The Bad News Has Yet to
Come, 113 PuB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 16, 1984, at 6; DOE, TVA, and the Sale of Power, 113
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 16, 1984, at 39 (DOE held to an overly optimistic contract for the
purchase of TVA power).
3. See 113 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 16, 1984, at 49, 55, 59.

